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he U.S. Supreme Court, in Massachusetts v. EPA, quoted the 
following position put forth by the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA): The “well-documented rise in global temperatures” is 
possibly the “most pressing environmental challenge of our time.”1  
Within the opinion, the Court described the “harms associated with 
climate change” as “serious and well recognized”2 and acknowledged 
the “causal connection between man-made greenhouse gas emissions 
and global warming.”3  The Supreme Court held that the EPA both 
has the authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions under the 
Clean Air Act (CAA) and is in fact required to regulate greenhouse 
gas emissions, unless the Agency concludes either that greenhouse 
gases do not contribute to climate change or that it cannot 
scientifically determine the gases’ harmful effects.4  In light of this 
holding and the current science on climate change, it is now possible 
for the EPA to create a national program to address individual and 
corporate contributions to climate change by enacting greenhouse gas 
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1 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 504–05 (2007). 
2 Id. at 521. 
3 Id. at 523. 
4 Robert V. Percival, Massachusetts v. EPA: Escaping the Common Law’s Growing 
Shadow, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 111, 127 (2008). 
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emissions regulations, although the timing and reporting format for 
this comprehensive regulatory policy is unknown.5  Not only is this 
comprehensive reporting possible, it is inevitable.  The EPA can no 
longer reasonably refuse to regulate greenhouse gas emissions given 
the current state of science and the statutory standards found in the 
CAA.6 
However, the process of converting a comprehensive regulatory 
theory into an enforceable regulation is lengthy and controversial 
under both the Administrative Procedure Act and the judicial process.  
For example, the EPA voluntarily began investigations under the 
CAA to regulate the lead content in gasoline in 1970.7  Different 
controls were evaluated in 1971, two different maximum reduction 
timelines were proposed in 1972, and a lead phase-down was finally 
adopted in 1973.8  But this ruling was followed by litigation in 
multiple federal circuits, finally leading to affirmation by the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 1976 and by the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in 1980.9  As a result, the lead 
phase-down regulations did not take effect until ten years after the 
process was initiated.10 
Returning to greenhouse gases, the EPA did issue an endangerment 
proposal on April 17, 2009, “proposing to find that greenhouse gases 
in the atmosphere endanger the public health and welfare of current 
and future generations.”11  However, the process to obtain greenhouse 
gas emissions regulation under the CAA is still likely not near: first, a 
proposed endangerment finding is followed by public comments and 
 
5 For a discussion of the different comprehensive policies the EPA might adopt, see 
Thomas D. Peterson et al., Developing a Comprehensive Approach to Climate Change 
Policy in the United States that Fully Integrates Levels of Government and Economic 
Sectors, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 227 (2008). 
6 Id. at 228. 
7 Id. at 256 n.98. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Proposed Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases 
Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 18,886, 18,886 (proposed Apr. 
24, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. 1).  A proposed endangerment finding occurs 
when the EPA Administrator advises the public that the Agency is planning on 
recognizing that certain chemicals or circumstances threaten the public health or welfare.  
See id. at 18,888.  The public can then submit comments before a final endangerment 
finding is formalized and released.  Id.  
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a final endangerment finding12 and, then, the regulation process 
begins, including proposed standards based on science, technology, 
and stakeholder input, public comments, a final order, and 
implementation—often phasing in over multiple years.  Assuming 
both that greenhouse gas regulation will follow an administrative 
process similar to that of lead and the EPA immediately started 
researching a comprehensive greenhouse gas strategy after the 2007 
Massachusetts v. EPA decision, any national standards and 
accompanying disclosure structure will likely not be implemented 
until 2017.13 
The question thus becomes: How can a business prepare for these 
unknown but imminent changes?  How can a business ensure that it is 
focusing on and pursuing the “triple bottom line,” embracing profit, 
the planet, and people simultaneously, when making business 
decisions?14  Additionally, how can a state, the traditional regulator of 
business law, prepare its incorporated businesses to weather these 
changes successfully and efficiently to ensure continued, or greater, 
business tax revenues and jobs for their citizens?  More importantly, 
how can a state ensure that its incorporated businesses will be able to 
pursue responsible decisions regarding climate change free from the 
threat of litigation by dissenting, profit-focused shareholders?  
Finally, how can the federal government ensure uniformity among 
businesses for greenhouse gas emissions regulation?  This uniformity 
is crucial for investors and customers to readily compare the extent of 
a business’s climate change responsibility today—without having to 
wait the ten years it will likely take for the EPA regulations to be 
formalized. 
Environmentally minded citizens are already clamoring for green 
businesses, sustainability, and social and environmental 
accountability.15  Businesses are being assessed by environmentally 
conscious investors and customers alike based on the companies’ role 
and purpose within the worldwide community, not just on their 
 
12 Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA Finds Greenhouse Gases Pose Threat 
to Public Health, Welfare/Proposed Finding Comes in Response to 2007 Supreme Court 
Ruling (Apr. 17, 2009), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/0/ 
0EF7DF675805295D8525759B00566924. 
13 See Peterson et al., supra note 5, at 256 n.98. 
14 Kathleen Gilligan, Trends, Predictions and Compliance in Green CSR; Special Issues 
for Law Firms, in GREEN TECHNOLOGY LAW AND BUSINESS 2009: STRATEGIES FOR 
FINANCE, CARBON TRADING, IT, AND CARBON NEUTRAL POLICIES 201, 206 (PLI Corp. 
Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 1718, 2009). 
15 See Peterson et al., supra note 5, at 228. 
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profitability.16  Environmentally and socially responsible investors—
and even some board members—should urge that quarterly profit 
returns be joined with considerations of sustainability when assessing 
the success of a business by arguing that businesses should be 
reconceived “to fit into the Earth community of the present for the 
future.”17  As evidence of this mounting pressure, $2.71 trillion of the 
$25.1 trillion being invested in the United States in 2008 was invested 
in accordance with the Socially Responsible Investing guidelines.18  
Many of these investors chose “green” mutual funds that invest only 
in environmentally responsible companies.19  These green mutual 
funds allow environmentally conscious investors to ensure that their 
financial resources reflect their interest in stopping the waste of 
Earth’s natural resources.20 
However, despite this mounting public pressure, most investors 
remain in the dark about which businesses are pursuing responsible 
decisions regarding climate change and, more importantly, on how an 
individual corporation’s interpretation of climate change 
responsibility compares to its competitors’ interpretation.  This 
information is simply not available to the investing public in a readily 
digestible format.  This lack of comparable information is leading 
some investors to decide against making environmentally conscious 
choices in their investments despite a developed interest, thus freezing 
out part of the environmentally responsible investing market.  In 
addition to investors being unable to access this information, 
businesses are also frozen as a result of the uncertainty experienced 
by other profit-driven shareholders and directors regarding the extent 
of protection against dissenting, profit-driven shareholder suits 
afforded to them by the business judgment rule. 
Additional uncertainty arises concerning the form and substance of 
a disclosure when a business voluntarily decides to disclose 
information regarding its climate change responsibility.  What should 
the disclosure’s scope be: per facility, nationwide, or worldwide?  
Should emissions be reported on an annual basis or by daily 
 
16 Judith E. Koons, Earth Jurisprudence: The Moral Value of Nature, 25 PACE ENVTL. 
L. REV. 263, 332–33 (2008). 
17 See id. at 337. 
18 Soc. Inv. Forum, Overview for Financial Professionals, http://www.socialinvest.org/ 
resources/professionals.cfm (last visited Dec. 27, 2009). 
19 Rebecca Clarren, Green Investing 101 (Nov. 26, 2007), http://www.salon.com/mwt/ 
good_life/2007/11/26/green_investing/. 
20 See id. 
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maximums?  Should the disclosure include direct and indirect 
emissions?  Where is the line drawn on what emissions are included, 
and who draws it?  These questions, which reveal current reporting 
uncertainties, turn to fear as a company worries that, if it includes all 
emissions from all sources worldwide and its competitor only 
includes direct emissions from U.S. facilities, then the company will 
appear to be the larger polluter in comparison, while the reality may 
be very different.  This concern leads many companies to choose not 
to report their impact on climate change at all, choosing instead to 
wait the ten years it may possibly take for the EPA to finalize its 
greenhouse gas emissions policy. 
However, as discussed above, public concern over climate change 
is growing, and both shareholders and consumers are already arguing 
for climate change responsibility through disclosure and mitigation of 
greenhouse gas emissions.  Shareholders and consumers are eager to 
know the implications their business activities are having on climate 
change today, not ten years from now.  This Comment calls on state 
legislatures and another federal agency, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), to support this process.  The authorizing and 
other constituency provisions of state business corporation laws 
should be modified to explicitly support social and environmental 
responsibility.  This legislative support can then be relied upon to 
protect and direct corporate decisions that account for climate change 
when the business judgment rule fails due to a lack of case law and 
inconsistency in court decisions.  Mandatory provisions with explicit 
guidance on how to account for climate change responsibility could 
allow for uniform disclosure and mitigation across the states.  
However, as a result of the “race to the bottom,”21 only general, 
voluntary provisions will pass through the state legislatures as states 
are forced to choose the least costly, and thus least effective, 
regulations to ensure that corporations will remain incorporated 
within their state. 
An additional option would be for the SEC to step in and clarify a 
business’s disclosure obligations in relation to climate change 
responsibility and create uniform guidelines that could be applied 
throughout the nation.  Through a combination of encouragement of 
new state laws and protections for general climate change 
responsibility and the SEC’s establishment of explicit federal 
guidelines for clarification and uniformity, climate change disclosure 
 
21 For a description of the “race to the bottom,” see infra Part II.B. 
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and mitigation would be possible and protected under existing laws 
without the need to wait for the EPA’s greenhouse gas emissions 
policy. 
In Part I, this Comment explores a recent corporate perspective 
termed climate change responsibility, which examines the connection 
between corporations and climate change, and the litigation risks 
faced by businesses that choose the responsible alternative.  Building 
on this baseline, this Comment examines two potential state 
legislative methods to allow for climate change disclosure.  First, Part 
II investigates a strategy of mandatory state corporate law 
modification requiring detailed greenhouse gas emissions disclosure 
and mitigation that is unlikely to be passed due to a race to the 
bottom.  Part III then surveys a policy of optional state modification 
of authorization and constituency provisions, including a successfully 
passed Oregon model, which implements general support for 
increased environmental responsibility that, while optional, is more 
likely to be enacted.  Moving to federal law, Part IV looks at the 
drafting and implementation of guidelines detailing both the scope 
and form for greenhouse gas emissions disclosures by the SEC to 
reinterpret the existing disclosure requirements in light of climate 
change responsibility.  As a reflection on this discussion, the 
Appendix provides an example of SEC guidelines under Items 101 
and 103 of Regulation S-K specifically addressing climate change 
disclosure that could be adopted and implemented.  Through the 
combination of state legislative encouragement and protection and 
SEC guidelines creating uniformity, it may be possible to create a 
system of climate change responsibility in which businesses, 
investors, and customers can easily compare and make decisions 
today based on their future impact on the world’s climate. 
I 
THE CONNECTION BETWEEN CLIMATE CHANGE, GREENHOUSE GAS 
EMISSIONS, AND CORPORATIONS 
A.  A Brief History of Anthropogenic Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
In 1896, Swedish chemist Svante August Arrhenius posed a theory 
that the carbon emissions created by humans during the process of 
coal combustion could lead to a warming of the Earth’s atmosphere.22  
 
22 See Svante Arrhenius, On the Influence of Carbonic Acid in the Air upon the 
Temperature of the Ground, 41 PHIL. MAG. & J. SCI. 237, 249 (1896). 
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Arrhenius explained that carbon emissions have higher absorption 
coefficients than the regularly occurring atmospheric composition of 
gases and, thus, that these emissions have the ability to trap additional 
solar energy within the atmosphere.23  This theory has since become a 
well-documented reality as scientists have found that increases in 
global temperatures coincide with significant increases in carbon 
concentrations in the atmosphere.24  Similar to Arrhenius’s original 
model, it is now understood that carbon gases in the atmosphere trap 
the sun’s infrared radiation and prevent the release of that radiation 
back into space.25  The collection of carbon gases with the ability to 
both trap the sun’s heat and subsequently raise the atmospheric 
temperature is known as greenhouse gases, which traditionally 
includes carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N20), 
hydroflourocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulfur 
hexafluoride (SF6).26 
While the science behind the capacity of these greenhouse gases to 
raise the Earth’s temperature has been clear for some time, the 
understanding of the interaction between large corporations and their 
human-induced greenhouse gas emissions has taken the public longer 
to grasp.  Beginning in the late 1970s, the U.S. government began to 
officially fund research into the correlation between climate 
processes, greenhouse gas emissions, and the sources and sinks of 
these emissions.27  This research has now expanded to a global scale, 
recently resulting in the following conclusion by the 2007 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change: 
Most of the observed increase in globally averaged temperatures 
since the mid-20th century is very likely [i.e., greater than 90% 
certainty] due to the observed increase in anthropogenic greenhouse 
gas concentrations. . . . Discernible human influences now extend to 
other aspects of climate, including ocean warming, continental-
average temperatures, temperature extremes and wind patterns.28 
 
23 Id. at 248–49. 
24 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 504–05 (2007). 
25 Id. at 505. 
26 CAL. CLIMATE ACTION REGISTRY, CALIFORNIA CLIMATE ACTION REGISTRY 
GENERAL REPORTING PROTOCOL: REPORTING ENTITY-WIDE GREENHOUSE GAS 
EMISSIONS VERSION 3.1, at 6 (2009), available at http://www.climateregistry.org/ 
resources/docs/protocols/grp/GRP_3.1_January2009.pdf. 
27 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 507. 
28 PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, THE CAUSES OF GLOBAL CLIMATE 
CHANGE: SCIENCE BRIEF 1, at 5 (2008) (first alteration in source) (citing 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Summary for Policymakers, in 
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B.  Connecting Anthropogenic Greenhouse Gas Emissions to 
Corporations 
Once the connection between climate change and anthropogenic 
greenhouse gas emissions was proven with ninety percent certainty, 
the next step was to pinpoint the sources of these greenhouse gas 
emissions.  Research showed that the largest source of both carbon 
dioxide emissions and overall greenhouse gas emissions was just as 
Arrhenius predicted: fossil fuel combustion.29  Fossil fuel combustion 
is central to the business model of several large American businesses.  
For example, Chevron Corporation, a Pennsylvania corporation that 
engages in oil and gas exploration and refining, emitted sixty-eight 
million tons of greenhouse gases in 2006.30  Ninety percent of those 
emissions is the result of fossil fuel combustion, which occurs during 
the standard operating procedure of flaring and venting natural gases, 
a by-product of the crude oil refining process.31  BP America, Inc., a 
Delaware corporation that owns and operates the largest oil refinery 
in California, emitted sixty-five million tons of carbon dioxide in 
2006.32  ConocoPhillips Company, a Delaware corporation that 
operates three oil refineries in California, emitted 62.3 million tons of 
carbon dioxide in 2006.33  If one also included the emissions from the 
 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE 
PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 1, 5 (Susan Solomon et al. eds., 2007)), available at 
http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/global-warming-science-brief-august08.pdf. 
29 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 2009 U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS INVENTORY REPORT: 
INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990–2007, at ES-6 
(2009), available at http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/downloads09/Inventory 
USGhG1990-2007.pdf. 
30 Complaint for Damages at 7, Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 2009 
WL 3326113 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (No. 08-CV-01138 SBA) (citing Chevron Corp., Climate 
Change (May 2009), http://www.chevron.com/globalissues/climatechange/actionplan/#), 
available at http://www.climatelaw.org/cases/country/us/kivalina/Kivalina%20Complaint 
.pdf. 
31 Id. (citing CARBON DISCLOSURE PROJECT, CHEVRON CORPORATION RESPONSE TO 
THE CARBON DISCLOSURE PROJECT 5TH QUESTIONNAIRE 11 (2007), available at 
http://search.cdproject.net/responses2/attachedfiles/Responses/40936/876/CDP5_Chevron 
_AQ.pdf). 
32 Id. at 6 (citing CARBON DISCLOSURE PROJECT, BP PLC 2007 SUBMISSION TO THE 
CARBON DISCLOSURE PROJECT (CDP5) 8 (2007), available at 
http://www.search.cdproject.net/responses2/attachedfiles/Responses/40910/1422/CDP5 
_BP_AQ.doc). 
33 Id. at 8 (citing CARBON DISCLOSURE PROJECT, GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS 
QUESTIONNAIRE: CONOCOPHILLIPS CORPORATION 5 (2007), available at 
http://www.conocophillips.com/EN/newsroom/other_resources/documents/CDP5_Conoco
Phillips2007_AQ.pdf). 
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use of the oil products produced by these companies, the numbers 
would be much higher.  These mammoth corporations in the energy 
sector are the largest contributors to greenhouse gas emissions based 
on the use of their oil products, and, therefore, their standard 
operations can be directly linked to climate change.34 
The energy sector corporations, however, are not the only 
contributors to greenhouse gas emissions and climate change.  Nearly 
all private and public entities spanning across industry sectors and 
geographical borders emit some form and quantity of greenhouse 
gases.  These entities leave a “carbon footprint” that can be linked to 
global climate change.35  This carbon footprint includes both direct 
emissions from mobile combustion sources (e.g., vehicles), stationary 
combustion sources (e.g., water heaters, air conditioners, furnaces, 
boilers), process sources (e.g., agricultural processes), and fugitive 
sources (e.g., pipeline leaks in air conditioning) and indirect 
emissions from purchased and consumed electricity, steam, or direct 
heating and cooling.36  For example, the University of California, 
Santa Barbara campus directly and indirectly emitted approximately 
58,550 tons of carbon dioxide in 2007.37  The largest contributors of 
these emissions were purchased electricity—sixty-four percent of 
total emissions—and stationary combustion—thirty-four percent of 
total emissions.38 
 
34 See Steven Ferrey, Gate Keeping Global Warming: The International Role of 
Environmental Assessments and Regulation in Controlling Choice for Future Power 
Development, 19 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 101, 157 (2009). 
35 CAL. AIR RES. BD. ET AL., LOCAL GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS PROTOCOL FOR THE 
QUANTIFICATION AND REPORTING OF GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS INVENTORIES: 
VERSION 1.0, at 10 (2008), available at http://www.climateregistry.org/resources/docs/ 
protocols/industry/local-gov/lgo_protocol_september2008.pdf. 
36 Id. at 23–24. 
37 CAL. CLIMATE ACTION REGISTRY, ANNUAL EMISSIONS REPORT: UNIVERSITY OF 
CALIFORNIA, SANTA BARBARA 1 (2009), available at http://facilities.ucsb.edu/_client/ 
pdf/sustainability/climate_registry/CREntityEmissionReport2006.pdf. 
38 Id.  (Direct emissions included in metric tons of carbon dioxide emissions are from 
mobile combustion (1359.26), stationary combustion (19,858.05), process emissions 
(0.00), and fugitive emissions (0.00).  Indirect emissions included in metric tons of carbon 
dioxide emissions are from purchased electricity (37,454.18), purchased steam (0.00), and 
purchased heating and cooling (0.00)). 
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C.  Climate Change Responsibility: Recognizing the Financial and 
Moral Risks of Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
As the links between specific corporations, their greenhouse gas 
emissions, and the corresponding increases in global temperature 
become more concrete, business executives and investors alike will 
likely be taking increased financial and moral interest in achieving 
climate change responsibility.39  Greenhouse gas emissions and 
climate change effects will have physical, regulatory, and behavioral 
impacts on a business based on the long-term system view inherently 
associated with this environmental change.40  Despite the current lack 
of a greenhouse gas emissions standard formulated by the EPA under 
the CAA, the impact of climate change on corporations is already 
being felt today.  For example, financial risk as a result of greenhouse 
gas emissions is a very real and current concern of ExxonMobil, BP 
America, Chevron, ConocoPhillips, Shell Oil Company, and other 
large power corporations—the largest greenhouse gas emitters, as 
discussed above—due to pending litigation for the harms resulting 
from climate change, such as increased sea level, storm intensity, 
permafrost melting, and erosion.41 
The financial risk extends beyond these large corporations to all 
greenhouse gas emitters as President Obama calls for an “economy-
wide” cap-and-trade program to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 
eighty percent by 2050.42  “Economy-wide” indicates that all large-
 
39 See Lenny T. Mendonca & Jeremy Oppenheim, Investing in Sustainability: An 
Interview with Al Gore and David Blood, MCKINSEY Q., May 2007, at 10, 
http://www.mckinsey.com/clientservice/ccsi/pdf/Investing_in_Sustainability.pdf. 
40 A long-term system view accounts for the harmful effects of climate change on all 
businesses over their lifetime.  Id. at 3. 
41 See, e.g., Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 2009 WL 3326113 (N.D. 
Cal. 2009) (considering suit brought by a federally recognized, native Alaskan Inupiat 
Tribe facing the destruction of their Arctic Circle settlement due to the melting of sea ice 
and resulting massive erosion against multiple U.S. industrial corporations that contributed 
to the emission of large quantities of greenhouse gases); Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power 
Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (examining plaintiff’s request that the court cap 
the greenhouse gas emissions of multiple large power companies to abate the public 
nuisance of climate change), vacated, 582 F.3d 309 (2009); see also California v. Gen. 
Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ (EMC), 2007 WL 2726871 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007) 
(analyzing a public nuisance claim brought by the State of California against several large 
automobile manufacturers for their effect on climate change). 
42 OBAMA FOR AM., BARACK OBAMA AND JOE BIDEN: NEW ENERGY FOR AMERICA, 
http://www.barackobama.com/pdf/factsheet_energy_speech_080308.pdf (last visited Jan. 
1, 2010).  A cap-and-trade program is an administrative tool used to control climate 
change by providing economic incentives to companies in exchange for the companies’ 
reduction of their greenhouse gas emissions.  See CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, CAP AND 
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scale emitters, not just the large emitters in the energy sector, will 
both have an explicit maximum limit on the quantity of greenhouse 
gases they can emit and be forced to purchase allowances or face 
financial consequences if they exceed this limit.43  In addition to the 
regulatory costs associated with these standards, mitigation and 
adaptation costs will also be high as corporations become better suited 
to a new climate.  A University of California, Berkeley study 
estimates that the damages posed to U.S. businesses from forced 
mitigation and adaptation, assuming current greenhouse gas emissions 
levels are not substantially reduced, are tens of billions of dollars per 
year in direct costs, uncalculated indirect costs, and additional 
exposure of “trillions of dollars of assets to collateral risk.”44  In 
addition, climate change has ethical implications due to rising 
temperatures, drinking water shortages, and rising sea levels that will 
morally and financially affect businesses and investors alike.45  
Climate change damages the quality and viability of life, especially 
for the poor who face climate change without the financial resources 
to seek relief.46 
These financial and moral concerns resulting from greenhouse gas 
emissions have led many shareholders to consider sustainability 
criteria when making investment decisions.47  Sustainability criteria 
address the practice of conserving the Earth’s resources, so these 
resources can be naturally replaced before they are depleted through 
 
TRADE 101 (2008), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2008/01/pdf/capandtrade101 
.pdf.  In brief, the government sets a cap or limit on the quantity of greenhouse gas 
emissions allowed for each large-scale emitter.  Id.  Corporations significantly below this 
cap can sell credits or allowances for profit to other companies that are unable or unwilling 
to meet this cap.  Id. 
43 CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, supra note 42. 
44 FREDRICH KAHRL & DAVID ROLAND-HOLST, CALIFORNIA CLIMATE RISK AND 
RESPONSE 5 (Dep’t of Agric. & Res. Econ., Univ. of Cal., Research Paper No. 08102801, 
2008), available at http://are.berkeley.edu/~dwrh/CERES_Web/Docs/California Climate 
Risk and Response.pdf. 
45 Many poor nations are struggling with the cost of relocating these poor “climate 
refugees.”  The expense has led to some novel cases, including Gbemre v. Shell Petroleum 
Development Co. of Nigeria, where the claimant argued successfully that the flaring of 
gases in Nigeria was a “gross violation” of the Nigerian constitutional right to life and 
dignity.  Gbemre v. Shell Petroleum Dev. Co. Nigeria Ltd., [2005] No. FHC/B/CS/53/05, 
at 29–30 (F.H.C.) (Nigeria).  For information on climate change litigation strategies on an 
international front, see Climate Justice Programme, Climate Justice: Enforcing Climate 
Change Law, http://www.climatelaw.org (last visited Jan. 1, 2010). 
46 KAHRL & ROLAND-HOLST, supra note 44, at 111. 
47 Michael S. Knoll, Ethical Screening in Modern Financial Markets: The Conflicting 
Claims Underlying Socially Responsible Investment, 57 BUS. L. 681, 681 (2002). 
 592 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88, 581 
the balancing of the economic, environmental, and social vitality of a 
business.48 
Under the climate change perspective presented above, this 
Comment argues that business sustainability must also include a 
concept termed within this Comment as “climate change 
responsibility.”  Climate change responsibility, from an individual 
business perspective, is achieved through the recognition of a 
corporation’s social and environmental impact through its impact on 
climate change.  Climate change is attributable to anthropogenic 
greenhouse gas emissions.  Therefore, through the quantification, 
disclosure, and mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions, this Comment 
argues that a business can achieve climate change responsibility.  
Disclosure is a key piece of the climate change responsibility puzzle, 
as it allows investors and customers to make their own decisions 
accounting for climate change as they invest their money and 
purchase goods and services by comparing competing businesses.49 
D.  Litigation Risks of Disclosing and Mitigating Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions 
The technology needed to disclose and mitigate greenhouse gas 
emissions requires extensive time and money.  Corporations have a 
legitimate fear that by investing this money and time today there will 
be a decreased profit in the short term.  The legal system in the United 
States largely divides businesses into for-profit and not-for-profit 
structures.50  Therefore, organizations that follow the triple-bottom-
line business model, which consists of the consideration of profit, 
people, and the planet,51 do not have explicit legal structures and fall 
 
48 Or. Envtl. Council, A Sustainable Economy, http://www.oeconline.org/our-work/ 
economy (last visited Jan. 4, 2010). 
49 See Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate 
Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1199 (1999) (describing the importance of 
disclosure for possible investments based on social and environmental impacts). 
50 Michael D. Gottesman, Comment, From Cobblestones to Pavement: The Legal Road 
Forward for the Creation of Hybrid Social Organizations, 26 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 345, 
345 (2007). 
51 The triple-bottom-line business model, sometimes shortened as “planet, people, 
profit,” means “‘using, developing and protecting resources in a manner that enables 
people to meet current needs and provides that future generations can also meet future 
needs, from the joint perspective of environmental, economic and community objectives.’”  
Barry Woods, Advancing the New Economy: Oregon Lawyers Embrace Sustainability, 
OR. ST. B. BULL., Oct. 2009, at 19 (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 184.421 (2009)), available 
at http://www.osbar.org/publications/bulletin/09oct/newecon.html. 
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into a legally unstable middle ground.  Without explicit state business 
law or SEC guidelines, the board of directors in these corporations 
find themselves debating whether to disclose climate change 
responsibility factors and, if so, what to include and what format 
those disclosures should take. 
These boards rely on the business judgment rule to survive 
dissenting shareholder lawsuits.  The business judgment rule “‘is a 
presumption that in making a business decision, the directors of a 
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the 
honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the 
company.’”52  In short, the business judgment rule ensures that a 
court will not substitute its judgment for that of the board of directors 
if the latter’s decision can be “attributed to any rational business 
purpose.”53  Thus, when applicable, the business judgment rule 
“insulates directors from liability, and imposes upon the party 
challenging the decision [namely the dissenting shareholders] the 
burden of rebutting the presumption.”54  In theory and practice, this 
burden should be nearly impossible to overcome. 
While climate change reform and sustainability gain in popularity 
among citizens and investors alike, boards of directors are driven to 
make decisions that consider climate change implications.55  These 
decisions, if different than a more profitable alternative, would 
hopefully be protected by the business judgment rule since the courts 
will presume that the board of directors is acting with some rational 
business purpose, thus creating a heavy, if not insurmountable, burden 
for any potential dissenting shareholder to overcome.  However, the 
business judgment rule, while well developed in Delaware, New 
York, and California,56 has not been fully developed in every state 
due to sparse case law.  In addition, there is still a common 
misconception that maximizing shareholder wealth is the only legal 
 
52 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 
473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)); see also OR. REV. STAT. § 60.357(1) (2009); FDIC v. 
Castetter, 184 F.3d 1040, 1044 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that the business judgment rule 
protects corporate officials from liability for breach of the duty of care if they act in good 
faith and without corrupt motives). 
53 Navellier v. Sletten, 262 F.3d 923, 946 n.12 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
54 Id. 
55 See Soc. Inv. Forum, supra note 18. 
56 See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., New Myths and Old Realities: The American Law 
Institute Faces the Derivative Action, 48 BUS. LAW. 1407 (1993). 
 594 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88, 581 
obligation for corporate decisions.57  To overcome this 
misconception, corporations can write objectives for their companies 
into their articles of incorporation, like an explicit commitment to 
climate change responsibility that extends beyond wealth 
maximization.58  There is little case law, however, that indicates 
whether these objectives would be legally protected in a shareholder 
derivative suit.59 
E.  State Legislative Modifications and SEC Guidelines to Protect 
Climate Change Responsibility 
Because of the uncertainty surrounding the application of the 
business judgment rule in this context, the business community is left 
with investors and companies sharing a drive to obtain climate change 
responsibility, but lacking the knowledge of whether the decisions 
motivated by that drive will be protected or what form those decisions 
should take.  Reform of the state corporate laws requiring greenhouse 
gas disclosure and mitigation can reduce this uncertainty and provide 
the needed security and affirmative support for corporations to make 
these decisions regarding climate change responsibility.  The first 
option is for state legislatures to specifically authorize profit-
sacrificing objectives in the state laws governing corporations to 
protect and even encourage climate change responsibility.  However, 
mandatory and explicit business regulations often cannot be passed 
legislatively due to the strong, regulation-wary business lobby.  Thus, 
the second option is for legislatures to pass general, ambiguous, and 
optional statutes to support environmentally and socially responsible 
decisions.  This Comment explores these first two options and then 
consider a third: federal SEC guidelines.  SEC guidelines provide 
guidance to businesses on how to comply with current laws and are 
written by the SEC, not a legislature, as a service to businesses to 
ensure successful compliance and avoid SEC enforcement.60  By 
interpreting current disclosure laws in light of the financial risks 
posed by climate change, the SEC can issue guidelines to businesses 
on a federal scale, creating a uniform framework for industry to 
 
57 Judd F. Sneirson, Green is Good: Sustainability, Profitability, and a New Paradigm 
for Corporate Governance, 94 IOWA L. REV. 987, 989 (2009). 
58 Gottesman, supra note 50, at 356–57. 
59 Id. at 357. 
60 Colleen P. Mahoney et al., SEC Enforcement Trends, SP018 A.L.I.–A.B.A. 427 
(2008). 
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achieve climate change responsibility, for investors to gain 
knowledge about the climate change impact of potential investment 
opportunities, and for businesses to obtain security against dissenting 
shareholders for their environmentally responsible decisions. 
II 
STATE-MANDATED CORPORATE CLIMATE CHANGE RESPONSIBILITY 
AND THE LIKELY OPPOSITION BY THE BUSINESS BAR 
A.  Proposed Model: A Mandatory Corporate Social Responsibility 
Report 
One approach to ensure the climate change responsibility of 
businesses is being pursued by Professor Nicholas Robinson of the 
Pace University School of Law.61  Professor Robinson is currently 
drafting a new legislative bill for various states, starting with 
Delaware.  This bill, if passed, would change state corporate laws to 
require that all companies file an annual social responsibility report.62  
This mandatory report would detail the company’s carbon footprint, 
including greenhouse gas emissions and mitigation practices being 
considered or adopted to minimize the footprint.63 
B.  The “Race to the Bottom”: The Possibility of Opposition from the 
Business Bar 
The power of business lobbyists and the “race to the bottom” is not 
to be underestimated, as both of these forces may undermine the 
ability of any single state to enact regulations that are stricter than 
those in another state.64  Since a business can easily change its state 
of incorporation, and thus the recipient of its state taxes, states often 
lower regulatory standards to encourage businesses to stay in or to 
move to that state in what is known as a “race to the bottom.”65  The 
business section of a state’s legal bar is often instrumental in lobbying 
within this race, ensuring that state corporate laws, while facially 
 
61 E-mail from Nicholas A. Robinson, Professor, Pace Univ. Sch. of Law, to Richard 
Hildreth, Professor, Univ. of Or. Sch. of Law (Dec. 23, 2008, 02:56:21 PST) (on file with 
author). 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND 
POLICY 101–03 (4th ed. 2003). 
65 See id. at 101–02. 
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appealing, are greatly inefficient at actually regulating.66  The laws 
resulting from the “charter competition”67 among states to enact the 
least regulation necessary to win the “race to the bottom” appeal to 
businesses that want to spend less money on compliance.68  Delaware 
is currently the winner in this charter competition, as it is the leading 
state for incorporation among businesses as a result of its inexpensive 
regulations that are believed to be efficient.69  Due to this race, the 
chances of mandatory regulations being passed through a state 
legislature are slim, especially in regulation-wary Delaware. 
C.  California’s Assembly Bill 2944: Evidence of the “Race to the 
Bottom” 
Evidence of this fear of regulation and the corresponding inability 
to pass legislation in the midst of opposition from the business bar can 
be found just this past year in liberal California.  Assembly Bill 2944 
was a proposed revision to Section 309 of the California Corporations 
Code to allow a director of a company to consider 
the long- and short-term effects that the corporation’s actions may 
have: (1) on the corporation’s prospects for potential growth, 
development, productivity, and profitability; (2) on its employees, 
suppliers, customers, and creditors; (3) on the economy of the state 
and the nation; (4) on the community and societal considerations; 
and (5) on the environment.70 
This bill was promoted as a means of filling the gap left by the lack of 
any constituency provision in California.71  The bill would create a 
so-called “other constituency provision,” which allows directors of a 
corporation to consider explicit interests, beyond those of 
shareholders, when making decisions that will greatly impact the 
course of business; the specific interests to be considered range from 
 
66 See Lynn M. LoPucki & Sara D. Kalin, The Failure of Public Company Bankruptcies 
in Delaware and New York: Empirical Evidence of a “Race to the Bottom,” 54 VAND. L. 
REV. 231, 271 (2001). 
67 See id. at 232. 
68 See Miriam A. Cherry, Working for (Virtually) Minimum Wage: Applying the Fair 
Labor Standards Act in Cyberspace, 60 ALA. L. REV. 1077, 1082 (2009). 
69 See LoPucki & Kalin, supra note 66, at 232. 
70 S. JUDICIARY COMM., ANALYSIS OF ASSEMBLY BILL 2944, 2007–2008 Leg., Reg. 
Sess., at 1 (Cal. 2008) [hereinafter BILL ANALYSIS], available at http://info.sen.ca.gov/ 
pub/07-08/bill/asm/ab_2901-2950/ab_2944_cfa_20080611_123248_sen_comm.html. 
71 Id. at 7. 
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state to state.72  Like the business judgment rule, an other 
constituency provision’s purpose is to shield directors from dissenting 
shareholder liability when decisions are made based on more than 
profit alone.73 
California’s Business Corporation Act, however, has no such 
provision and, thus, no explicit statutory protection for directors who 
consider constituency interests beyond their shareholders’ interests, 
like employees, suppliers, and creditors.74  This limitation is 
especially apparent “in a sale situation, in which the sole duty of a 
director is to maximize immediate shareholder value.”75  For 
example, the proponents of Assembly Bill 2944 cite to corporations 
that have specifically decided not to incorporate in California due to 
the lack of an other constituency provision.76  Yet the business bar of 
California took official opposition to the bill, claiming that the 
provision would actually expand the standard of care for corporate 
directors, which would (1) leave directors less accountable for their 
decisions due to the expanded discretion they would enjoy under the 
bill, (2) create a system of entrenched directors who could escape the 
consequences of a successful takeover, and (3) create additional 
burdens for conscientious directors to define what the economic, 
social, and environmental factors entail and how much weight to give 
them.77  These apprehensions culminated in a veto by Governor 
Schwarzenegger in response to a letter from the business bar in 
California detailing the concerns listed above.78  Similar other 
constituency provisions have passed in thirty-three states without any 
of these concerns coming to fruition,79 yet California was unable to 
pass this legislation due to the business bar’s opposition. 
 
72 Edward S. Adams & John H. Matheson, A Statutory Model for Corporate 
Constituency Concerns, 49 EMORY L.J. 1085, 1087 (2000); see also Judd F. Sneirson, 
Race to the Left: A Legislator’s Guide to Greening a Corporate Code, 88 OR. L. REV. 491 
(2009). 
73 Adams & Matheson, supra note 72, at 1088. 
74 BILL ANALYSIS, supra note 70, at 2, 7. 
75 Id. at 9. 
76 Id. 
77 Memorandum from W. Derrick Britt, Vice Chair of Legislation, Bus. Law Section, 
State Bar of Cal., to the Office of Governmental Affairs 3–4 (Apr. 14, 2008), available at 
http://www.calbar.ca.gov/calbar/pdfs/sections/buslaw/corporations/ab-2944-statement-of    
-position-final.pdf. 
78 See Letter from Arnold Schwarzenegger, Governor, State of Cal., to the Members of 
the Cal. State Assembly (Sept. 30, 2008), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/07    
-08/bill/asm/ab_2901-2950/ab_2944_vt_20080930.html. 
79 Sneirson, supra note 72, at 499. 
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D.  The Potential for Climate Change Responsibility Through 
Mandatory State Legislation 
While a mandatory greenhouse gas disclosure and mitigation 
strategy is superficially appealing, it is unfortunately impractical to 
believe such explicit and expensive state legislation will become a 
reality.  If Delaware or another state were to pass such legislation, it is 
likely that the affected corporations would simply switch their state of 
incorporation to avoid the new laws altogether.  As a result, while this 
legislation is extremely attractive as a means of giving businesses the 
support necessary to make responsible decisions addressing climate 
change, giving investors the uniform greenhouse gas disclosure 
information they desire, and allowing for climate change mitigation 
sooner rather than later, the legislation is unlikely to make it past the 
state legislature. 
III 
GENERAL, OPTIONAL MODELS ALLOWING BUSINESSES TO TAKE 
CLIMATE CHANGE RESPONSIBILITY FOR GREENHOUSE GAS 
EMISSIONS 
A second option is to pass general, optional state legislation 
suggesting and encouraging corporations to take climate change 
responsibility.  By incorporating broad, general language about 
environmental and social responsibility instead of controversial 
climate change language and allowing for optional implementation, 
thereby permitting individual businesses to include or disregard the 
new statute, it is possible to pass this kind of legislation despite the 
“race to the bottom.”  Oregon House Bill 2826 and House Bill 2829 
provide excellent models for the basis of a discussion of how this 
legislation can be drafted and promoted. 
A.  Oregon House Bill 2826: An Optional Provision Urging 
Environmental and Social Responsibility 
An environmentally and socially responsible model of an 
authorizing provision—the section of state legislation that legally 
allows a company to incorporate within a state—was adopted by the 
Oregon legislature and took effect January 1, 2008, as Oregon House 
Bill 2826,80 which was later codified as Oregon Revised Statute 
 
80 Or. State Legislature, 2007 House Measure History, House Bill 2826, 
http://www.leg.state.or.us/07reg/pubs/hsemh.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2010). 
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(ORS) 60.047(2)(e).81  This newly adopted statute added an option to 
Oregon’s Business Corporation Act allowing Oregon corporations to 
add “[a] provision authorizing or directing the corporation to conduct 
the business of the corporation in a manner that is environmentally 
and socially responsible” to their articles of incorporation.82  The 
statute provides that any new corporation formed in Oregon may 
include a provision in its articles of incorporation “authorizing or 
directing the corporation to be operated in a sustainable manner.”83  
“Moreover, any existing Oregon corporation can take that [same] step 
by amending its articles of incorporation, which will then govern 
operations after the date of the amendment.”84  With this statute, 
“Oregon’s Business Corporation Act became the first state corporate 
code to expressly acknowledge the goal of sustainable business 
practices.”85 
The statute was drafted by Oregon Lawyers for a Sustainable 
Future, a group of Oregon State Bar members “who seek to create a 
sustainable society and to encourage the legal profession and 
individual lawyers to increase their involvement in this endeavor.”86  
One of the drafters, business lawyer James M. Kennedy, praised “this 
landmark legislation [as] in line with both Oregon’s national 
reputation as a leader in the sustainability movement and the theme of 
sustainability selected by the 2007 Oregon Business Summit.  It will 
be followed with great interest by other states and corporate law 
professors across the nation.”87 
As discussed above, an environmentally and socially responsible, 
sustainable business can and should include the implicit goal of 
climate change responsibility, including greenhouse gas emissions 
disclosure and mitigation, in its operation.  However, explicit 
language defining what environmentally and socially responsible 
practices are, like climate change disclosure, limits the ability of state 
 
81 OR. REV. STAT. § 60.047(2)(e) (2009). 
82 Id. 
83 Press Release, Or. Lawyers for a Sustainable Future, New Law Embeds 
“Sustainability” in Oregon Business Corporation Act (June 1, 2007), 
http://www.earthleaders.org/olsf/hb2826. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 Ctr. for Earth Leadership, Oregon Lawyers for a Sustainable Future, 
http://www.earthleaders.org/olsf (last visited Jan. 4, 2010). 
87 Press Release, supra note 83. 
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legislatures to pass statutes similar to the one passed in Oregon.88  
Under the mantra of “no more regulation,” fear runs strong that states 
with corporate laws that are too far out of line with the norm will 
watch helplessly as corporations leave their state to incorporate in 
another state with less regulation.89  To avoid this scenario and gain 
acceptance of the bill, the drafters of House Bill 2826 made it 
permissive rather than mandatory.90  Additionally, they did not 
attempt to define “socially or environmentally responsible corporate 
behavior,” leaving the definition to the interpretation of the unique 
business entities that adopt it.91 
This statute was promoted to the Oregon legislature as a means for 
a corporation to provide directors with some protection in making 
environmentally and socially responsible decisions, such as the 
decision to disclose and mitigate greenhouse gas emissions, without 
the fear of derivative shareholder suits resulting from the sparse case 
law in Oregon regarding the business judgment rule.92  The lack of 
judicial decisions on the business judgment rule may create a 
hesitation within a corporation that it will be subject to shareholder 
derivative suits if it chooses a socially or environmentally responsible 
alternative that does not aim to maximize shareholder profits.93  As 
evidence of the sparse case law on the business judgment rule in 
Oregon, the Oregon Supreme Court has not decided a case relying on 
the business judgment rule since 1967.94  Increasing the fear of 
liability is a case from the U.S. District Court of Oregon in 2007 that 
recited the business judgment rule but then decided to rule against the 
decision of the corporation’s managers anyway, substituting the 
court’s own judgment for that of the corporation’s managers in direct 
violation of the business judgment rule.95  Due to the lack of Oregon 
case law on the business judgment rule and, therefore, the lack of 
confidence by boards of directors to make environmentally and 
socially responsible decisions that may not necessarily be profit 
 
88 Telephone Interview with Dick Roy, Managing Dir., Ctr. for Earth Leadership (Feb. 
24, 2009). 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Sneirson, supra note 57, at 1019. 
93 Id. 
94 See McMunn v. ML & H Lumber, Inc., 429 P.2d 798, 800–01 (Or. 1967). 
95 See Colvin v. Colvin, No. 05-409-AA, 2007 WL 2248160, at *11–15 (D. Or. Aug. 1, 
2007). 
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maximizing, members of the Oregon legislature were worried that 
Oregon businesses may be “chilled . . . especially as [their decisions] 
relate . . . to environmentally and socially responsible conduct.”96 
Other reasons presented to the House Judiciary Committee in 
promoting this statute included: the recognition of a “shareholder 
democracy” where a contract could be formed between a corporation 
and its shareholders to require the business to be environmentally and 
socially responsible; a focus on the need for transparency of corporate 
objectives between shareholders and the board of directors; and a 
recognition that this provision is optional, not mandatory, for Oregon 
businesses.97  This need for transparency between shareholders and 
boards of directors is especially applicable in the climate change 
context when an environmentally responsible board chooses to 
implement costly greenhouse gas emission-mitigation techniques.  
While not necessarily in the best interests of immediate profit, a board 
may decide it is the correct decision to take climate change 
responsibility, prepare for imminent EPA regulations under the CAA, 
or both.  This long-term insight into the social and environmental 
impacts of a business is exactly what the Oregon legislature was 
hoping for and what environmentally conscious investors would like 
to be aware of.  It was also emphasized that Oregon businesses that 
choose not to adopt this provision could still consider 
environmentally and socially responsible factors in their business 
decisions and receive the protection of the available, but sparsely 
supported, business judgment rule.98 
Nau, Inc., was presented to the Oregon legislature during the 
contemplation of House Bill 2826 as an example of an Oregon 
business that has expressly authorized its board to consider 
environmental and social responsibility.99  Nau’s Rules of Corporate 
Responsibility state: 
The Corporation shall endeavor to conduct all aspects of its 
business in an environmentally and socially responsible manner, 
including the promotion of peaceful conflict resolution, the fair and 
humane management of factory working conditions, the equitable 
 
96 See Hearing on H.R. 2826 Before the H. Judiciary Comm., 74th Legis. Assem., Reg. 
Sess., tape 77A, at 21:52 (Mar. 13, 2007) [hereinafter House Hearing on H.R. 2826] 
(statement of James Kennedy, Partner, Kennedy & Kennedy LLP).  All legislative 
materials cited in this Comment are located in the Oregon State Archives, Salem, Oregon. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
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treatment of its employees, the implementation of a sustainable 
process of product creation, waste minimization and recycling, and 
philanthropy . . . . In this regard, the officers and directors will use 
their discretion and business judgment to determine how best to 
implement this policy consistent with their fiduciary duties to the 
stockholders of the Corporation.100 
Directors and officers of the company are therefore authorized both 
to take into consideration and to balance environmental aspects, 
human rights, human health and safety, and the dignity of employees 
when making decisions.101  As a result of these considerations, the 
company has put in place a program requiring that five percent of the 
purchase price of all products sold is contributed to a charitable 
organization, an assurance that a fair and reasonable living wage will 
be paid to all employees, an official grant of “spousal” benefits to 
domestic partners of the same or opposite sex, the requirement that no 
partner will receive a cash salary more than twelve times that of the 
lowest-paid, full-time employee, and, finally, an incorporation 
provision that the charter, including these rules, can only be changed 
with a seventy-five percent shareholder vote.102  One of the charitable 
organizations receiving funds from product purchases is the 
Breakthrough Institute, “a small think tank with big ideas” about 
creating new progressive politics focusing on new “thought 
movements” to help deal with climate change and its inequitable 
social implications, including the promotion of “large public 
investments to make clean energy cheap.”103  The “socially and 
environmentally responsible” charter of Nau, Inc., created before the 
passage of House Bill 2826, was promoted as an example of what 
socially and environmentally beneficial progress can be made in 
Oregon as a result of this law. 
Focusing on these objectives and the example of Nau’s charter 
quoted above, House Bill 2826 was approved by the House thirty-
eight to eighteen and by the Senate seventeen to eleven.104  It was 
 
100 Nau, Rules of Corporate Responsibility, http://www.nau.com/nau/LIGHTBOX         
-CORP_RESPONSIBILITY/ (last visited Jan. 4, 2010). 
101 House Hearing on H.R. 2826, supra note 96, tape 77A, at 34:32 (statement of 
Jeffrey Wolfstone, Partner, Lane Powell PC). 
102 Id. 
103 The Breakthrough Institute, About: Our Mission, http://thebreakthrough.org/ 
about.shtml (last visited Jan. 4, 2010). 
104 Andy Giegerich, Some Biz Lawyers Worry over Sustainability Effort, PORTLAND 
BUS. J., Apr. 18, 2008, available at http://portland.bizjournals.com/portland/stories/2008/ 
04/21/focus7.html. 
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signed into law by Oregon Governor Ted Kulongoski on June 1, 
2007, who stated: 
I firmly believe that a commitment to sustainability is the best 
vehicle for creating long-term prosperity in Oregon, while also 
helping enrich our communities and our environment . . . . With this 
legislation, Oregon is pioneering efforts to create more sustainable 
business structures and I am confident that it will assist Oregon 
businesses in attracting investment and economic opportunities to 
the state.105 
However, not everyone was completely behind House Bill 2826.106  
Concerns arose both from those who misunderstood the bill and from 
those who felt left out of the drafting process.  Prior to the vote, the 
statute’s drafters had conducted outreach efforts to the Oregon State 
Bar’s Business Section, but those efforts did not generate a high level 
of interest.107  After considering the bill, the Business Section decided 
to take no position, neither for nor against, in committee hearings.108  
Additional concerns about whose vision or opinion of what is 
environmentally and socially responsible would be used were 
presented to the House Judiciary Committee; in other words, who 
measured the gains or losses to the environment based on different 
business decisions?109  Do the stockholders, the judiciary, the 
legislature, or perhaps all three decide whether a company is being 
environmentally and socially responsible?  What happens when the 
shareholders disagree on what constitutes the environmentally 
responsible decision?110  Could a stockholder potentially challenge a 
board of directors based on his or her vision of environmental 
responsibility?111  One of the law’s drafters, James Kennedy, 
responded to these concerns by indicating that businesses retain a 
“broad and general authority . . . to enter into these . . . contracts” and 
that “nothing in [the] bill . . . ‘changes [or expands]’ the rights of 
 
105 Press Release, supra note 83. 
106 This opposition is evidenced by the twenty-nine combined votes against its passage 
in the House and the Senate.  See Giegerich, supra note 104. 
107 Telephone Interview with Dick Roy, supra note 88. 
108 Id. 
109 House Hearing on H.R. 2826, supra note 96, tape 77A, at 29:52 (testimony of Rep. 
Wayne Krieger, Or. House of Representatives). 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
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dissenting shareholders.  They will have any cause of action that they 
have currently.”112 
Kennedy’s comment addressed the main concern over House Bill 
2826.  This Comment advocates for a method that allows a board to 
take climate change responsibility into consideration when making 
business decisions; however, the Oregon statute does not explicitly 
mention climate change or greenhouse gases.  As mentioned above, 
the language it does contain is a reference to “social and 
environmental responsibility” without defining what that phrase 
means and only indicating that a business may incorporate this pledge 
into its articles of incorporation.  Interestingly, this general, optional 
language was an intentional decision by the drafters to avoid defining 
an objective standard.113  The language also likely helped ensure the 
bill’s passage without greater opposition.  As a “modest proposal” 
with no obligation for businesses to opt in,114 formal opposition from 
the business bar was avoided.  Oregon can boast about its 
“enlightened” and “ambitious” promotion of social and environmental 
responsibility115 since the bill was actually enacted, in contrast to the 
failed other constituency provision of Assembly Bill 2944 in 
California, as described above. 
While Oregon’s provision is a permissive addition to the Oregon 
Business Corporation Act allowing corporations to include a socially 
and environmentally responsible objective in their charter,116 it serves 
as official state encouragement for environmentally conscious boards 
of directors to make environmentally conscious decisions.  This 
encouragement will hopefully embolden some Oregon businesses to 
make environmental and social responsibility a priority.  House Bill 
2826 puts the “world on notice,” as Chairman Macpherson stated to 
the Oregon House Judiciary Committee, that a company can consider 
the socially and environmentally responsible alternatives—a power 
they already enjoyed, in theory, under the business judgment rule and 
 
112 House Hearing on H.R. 2826, supra note 96, tape 77A, at 31:39 (testimony of James 
Kennedy, Partner, Kennedy & Kennedy LLP). 
113 Telephone Interview with Dick Roy, supra note 88. 
114 Hearing on H.R. 2826 Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 74th Legis. Assem., Reg. 
Sess., tape 127A, at 27:26 [hereinafter Senate Hearing on H.R. 2826] (statement of Jeffrey 
Wolfstone, Partner, Lane Powell PC). 
115 House Hearing on H.R. 2826, supra note 96, tape 77A, at 37:34 (statement of 
Jeffrey Wolfstone, Partner, Lane Powell PC). 
116 House Hearing on H.R. 2826, supra note 96, tape 77A, at 12:10 (statement of Rep. 
Gregory Macpherson, Or. House of Representatives). 
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other doctrines permitting profit-sacrificing decisions but may not 
have been exercising.117 
As discussed above, companies are given a broad allowance to 
write their own definition of social and environmental responsibility.  
Representative Linda Flores acknowledged this limitation and voiced 
her concern that nothing will be changing overnight, yet she still 
hopes this bill will ensure a “gradual recognition” that some Oregon 
companies want environmental and social responsibility to be a 
priority.118  Expressing a contrary view, Senator Beyer argued that 
this is not a recognition of social and environmental responsibility 
among Oregon businesses, but is instead simply adding “fluffy PC 
words” to the statute.119  Also, the statute does not offer clarity to 
businesses on how or whether to publicly report their environmental 
and social responsibility.  Are greenhouse gas emissions to be 
included?  If so, are direct and indirect emissions included?  Are 
emissions nationwide or worldwide included?  Due to this lack of 
clarification on how to report environmental and social responsibility, 
directors are likely to be concerned that their visions of how to be 
responsible will be unfairly compared to those of their competitors. 
As a practical matter, few businesses have chosen to adopt this 
optional provision.120  Carolyn Vogt, a shareholder at Lane Powell 
PC and a member of the firm’s Sustainability and Climate Change 
practice group, surveyed twenty-five corporate lawyers in Oregon and 
found that few corporate clients, if any, have added or even requested 
the provision.121  Fears resulting from both the general wording of the 
statute and the uncertainties in corporate implementation of the 
provision continue to leave businesses frozen when it comes to 
environmentally and socially responsible decision making.122  Perkins 
 
117 Senate Hearing on H.R. 2826, supra note 114, Exhibit C, at 1–2 (written testimony 
of James Kennedy, Partner, Kennedy & Kennedy LLP, & Jeffrey Wolfstone, Partner, Lane 
Powell PC); see also Senate Hearing on H.R. 2826, supra note 114, tape 127A, at 25:00 
(statement of Dick Roy, Managing Dir., Ctr. for Earth Leadership) (explaining that House 
Bill 2826 “simply states an option”). 
118 House Hearing on H.R. 2826, supra note 96, tape 77A, at 20:05 (statement of Rep. 
Linda Flores, Or. House of Representatives). 
119 Senate Hearing on H.R. 2826, supra note 114, tape 127A, at 34:53 (statement of 
Sen. Floyd Prozanski, Or. Senate). 
120 Carolyn M. Vogt, Law that Allows Incorporating Sustainability into Charters 
Allows Protection, Visibility, OR. BUS., Sept. 2008, available at http://www.lanepowell 
.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/05/vogtc_001.pdf. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
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Coie LLP, an international law firm specializing in business law, 
actually urges their Oregon corporation clients to 
decline to adopt provisions expressly permitted by [House Bill 
2826] without carefully considering and precisely defining what 
kind of environmentally and socially responsible business conduct 
the provisions will authorize or direct the company to pursue.  Any 
general authorization or directive would likely add uncertainty to 
corporate decision making and could conflict with the company’s 
fundamental business operations or goals.123 
It appears that the same fear involved in making the 
environmentally or socially responsible choice that drove the Oregon 
legislature to pass House Bill 2826 is still alive and well.  
Nevertheless, House Bill 2826 does provide unique support and 
encouragement for businesses to choose responsible options where 
none existed before.  While this is merely a small step toward 
achieving climate change responsibility, the bill was successfully 
enacted and, thus, it does acknowledge a potential shift in the state of 
Oregon’s priorities.  This official state encouragement will hopefully 
lead some corporations to voluntarily disclose their greenhouse gas 
emissions—a step in the right direction. 
B.  Oregon’s House Bill 2829: Upcoming Legislation Revising the 
Other Constituency Provision 
Expanding on House Bill 2826, the Oregon legislature is now 
considering House Bill 2829, a provision creating an other 
constituency provision for Oregon businesses that has a similar, yet 
more explicit, environmental and social responsibility focus.  As 
described above, other constituency provisions allow directors of a 
corporation to consider explicit interests beyond those of shareholders 
when making decisions that impact the business.124  Like the business 
judgment rule, an other constituency provision’s purpose is to shield 
directors from liability to dissenting shareholders when business 
decisions are made based on more than profit alone.125  Oregon’s 
current other constituency provision, ORS 60.357(5), allows a board 
of directors to consider the best interests of the corporation in hostile  
 
123 Perkins Coie, News/Publications: Recent Oregon Legislation Addresses Corporate 
Social Responsibility (Jan. 8, 2008), http://www.perkinscoie.com/news/pubs_detail.aspx 
?publication=1553&op=updates.com. 
124 Adams & Matheson, supra note 72, at 1087. 
125 See id. at 1088. 
 2009] Implementing Corporate Climate Change Responsibility 607 
takeover situations, including 
the social, legal and economic effects on employees, customers and 
suppliers of the corporation and on the communities and 
geographical areas in which the corporation and its subsidiaries 
operate, the economy of the state and nation, the long-term as well 
as short-term interests of the corporation and its shareholders, 
including the possibility that these interests may be best served by 
the continued independence of the corporation, and other relevant 
factors.126 
House Bill 2829, if enacted, would reorganize the statute and alter it 
in two major respects: (1) it would allow other constituency 
considerations to apply to all business decisions, not just hostile 
takeover situations and (2) it would add an explicit provision allowing 
for consideration of the social, environmental, and ethical impacts of 
decisions.127 
 
126 The full text of the statute is as follows: 
When evaluating any offer of another party to make a tender or exchange offer 
for any equity security of the corporation, or any proposal to merge or 
consolidate the corporation with another corporation or to purchase or otherwise 
acquire all or substantially all the properties and assets of the corporation, the 
directors of the corporation may, in determining what they believe to be in the 
best interests of the corporation, give due consideration to the social, legal and 
economic effects on employees, customers and suppliers of the corporation and 
on the communities and geographical areas in which the corporation and its 
subsidiaries operate, the economy of the state and nation, the long-term as well as 
short-term interests of the corporation and its shareholders, including the 
possibility that these interests may be best served by the continued independence 
of the corporation, and other relevant factors. 
OR. REV. STAT. § 60.357(5) (2009). 
127 H.R. 2829, 75th Legis. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2009).  The relevant amended 
language of the bill states: 
(5) In determining what a director believes is in the best interests of the 
corporation, the director may consider: (a) [t]he corporation’s interests in the 
short term and over the long term; (b) [e]conomic, environmental, social, legal or 
ethical interests the director may reasonably regard as appropriate for responsibly 
conducting the corporation’s business; (c) [t]he interests of the corporation’s 
employees, customers and suppliers and other persons who have business 
relationships with the corporation; (d) [e]ffects the corporation has on the 
communities or geographical areas in which the corporation operates; (e) [t]he 
possibility that the corporation’s interests may be best served by the 
corporation’s independence, if the director is evaluating another party’s tender or 
exchange offer for an equity security of the corporation, proposal to merge or 
consolidate the corporation with another business entity or proposal to purchase 
or otherwise acquire all or substantially all of the corporation’s properties and 
assets; and (f) [o]ther relevant interests. 
Id. (internal emphases omitted). 
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This revision will have a larger impact than House Bill 2826 as it 
will automatically apply to all corporations and, therefore, any board 
of directors, not only those who actively decide to include provisions 
addressing social and environmental responsibility within their 
articles of incorporation.128  Also, this revision will apply 
immediately to both pre-existing and new Oregon corporations.129  
However, the explicit considerations listed are still not mandatory: 
“the directors of the corporation may . . . give due consideration” to 
the listed factors.130 
To assure this bill was subjected to scrutiny by seasoned corporate 
lawyers and to avoid opposition from the Business Section of the 
Oregon State Bar, the other constituency provision bill was drafted by 
a task force of seven corporate lawyers, including the following: 
attorneys from the large Portland law firms of Stoel Rives LLP, 
Tonkon Torp LLP, Lane Powell PC, and Ater Wynne LLP; Dick Roy, 
a former corporate law partner at Stoel Rives LLP; and University of 
Oregon School of Law Professor Judd Sneirson.131  While the 
business bar and many of the same large corporate law firms were 
also involved in House Bill 2826, the business lawyers were involved 
on this occasion before House Bill 2829 was even submitted to the 
legislature.132  In addition to involving the large firms in the drafting, 
the House Bill 2829 task force formally presented the bill to the 
Business Section.133  By involving business attorneys in the drafting 
process, it was hoped either that opposition from the Business Section 
would be avoided or, at least, that the business bar would be well 
informed as to the true scope of the revision.134  Unfortunately, House 
Bill 2829 died in committee in March of 2009 despite these efforts.135  
The bill is scheduled to be reintroduced next year, possibly as a bar 
bill. 136 
 
128 Telephone Interview with Dick Roy, supra note 88. 
129 Id. 
130 § 60.357(5) (emphasis added). 
131 Telephone Interview with Dick Roy, supra note 88. 
132 Interview with Judd Sneirson, Professor, Univ. of Or. Sch. of Law, in Eugene, Or. 
(Mar. 17, 2009). 
133 Telephone Interview with Dick Roy, supra note 88. 
134 Id. 
135 E-mail from Judd Sneirson, Professor, University of Oregon School of Law, to 
Alison Torbitt (June 5, 2009, 12:27:00 PST) (on file with author). 
136 Id. 
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C.  Potential for Climate Change Responsibility Through Optional 
State Legislation 
All fifty states have a business incorporation statute, but only 
Oregon’s statute currently includes explicit language allowing, and 
maybe suggesting, a corporation to include environmental and social 
responsibility in its articles of incorporation.137  Thirty-three states 
have adopted an other constituency provision.138  Twelve of these 
states’ provisions, like Oregon’s current statute, apply only in hostile 
takeover situations.139  Four of these states, Oregon, Florida, 
Missouri, and Louisiana, have provisions that explicitly allow 
corporate boards to consider the social impacts of their decisions.140  
But none of these provisions explicitly allow for consideration of 
environmental or climate change impacts.  Every state should follow 
Oregon’s lead and revise the laws governing corporations to allow 
directors to take greater climate change responsibility without fear of 
liability from dissenting shareholders who believe that profit should 
be the only consideration. 
As the very small step in the form of House Bill 2826 indicates, 
state legislatures are not inclined to dictate how corporations should 
conduct business in their corporate laws.  The business lobby 
continues to urge less regulation, and corporations continue to wield 
the power of incorporating overnight in a new state should their 
current state’s regulations not follow the norm.  Thus, when amending 
the corporation-authorizing statutes, states are left with the sole option 
of passing general statutes with undefined terms such as 
“environmental and social responsibility.”  It is simply not possible to 
include the controversial topic of climate change in this regulation-
wary environment.  In addition, it is impossible to include mandatory 
language requiring climate change responsibility in the guise of 
greenhouse gas disclosure and mitigation within corporation-
authorizing or other constituency statutes. 
As a result of this inability to include stronger provisions on 
environmental and social responsibility, state laws governing 
corporations are unable to mitigate climate change on their own.  The 
attempt of these laws to create a change is insufficient to meet the 
immense challenges faced by human-induced climate change.  
 
137 Press Release, supra note 83. 
138 Sneirson, supra note 57, at 998. 
139 See Adams & Matheson, supra note 72, app. at 1123–35. 
140 Id. app. at 1125, 1128, 1129, 1132. 
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Luckily, many corporations already know they can pursue 
environmentally responsible objectives without such laws, and many 
businesses do so already, as a result of public pressure from 
environmentally driven shareholders and customers.141  
Unfortunately, due to the lack of explicit state direction or guidelines, 
those companies that voluntarily decide to tackle climate change 
responsibility do so in their own unique ways.  The results of these 
voluntary efforts are then disclosed to investors and customers in 
varying formats, leaving environmentally conscious shareholders 
unable to readily compare corporations in light of their claims of 
climate change responsibility.142 
While Oregon’s House Bill 2826, House Bill 2829 (if resubmitted), 
and other, similar state statutes encourage corporations to make 
commitments to disclosing and implementing plans to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions, the form and scope this disclosed 
information will take is still unclear.  It is also unclear whether 
climate change factors should even be considered for a corporation to 
claim environmental responsibility.  In addition, corporations are left 
both without direction or security on how to evaluate and make these 
climate change-conscious decisions and with the fear of how their 
disclosure decisions will be compared to those decisions of their 
competitors. 
IV 
A FEDERAL APPROACH: REQUIREMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND 
SOCIAL DISCLOSURE BY THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
UNDER REGULATION S-K 
A.  Current Environmental Disclosure Requirements 
The option with the greatest potential for immediate and uniform 
disclosure of climate change impacts to shareholders is a 
reconsideration of the disclosure requirements under the Securities 
Exchange Acts of 1933 and 1934.  The 1933 Act controls disclosure 
during the registration and sale of securities, while the 1934 Act 
 
141 For example, Google.org is a legally for-profit foundation that makes grants to 
nonprofit organizations in response to social and environmental problems, including 
climate change.  See Gottesman, supra note 50, at 345–46. 
142 See Michael R. Siebecker, Trust & Transparency: Promoting Efficient Corporate 
Disclosure Through Fiduciary-Based Discourse, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 115, 115–16 
(2009). 
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requires disclosure after registration on a periodic basis.143  These 
disclosure requirements are specifically designed to allow informed 
decision making by current and potential investors under the belief 
that honest markets require honest disclosure of all relevant 
information.144  Specifically, section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 gives the SEC the authority to require disclosure “as 
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of 
investors.”145  In researching the legislative history of section 14(a), 
Professor Cynthia A. Williams remarked, “Congress may have 
intended disclosure generally under the federal securities laws to be 
used to enhance corporate social accountability.”146  Congress 
specifically articulated that a major reason for requiring disclosure 
“was to change the ways in which large public corporations were 
being managed, and in particular to inculcate a greater sense of public 
accountability into corporate management.”147  Disclosure acts as a 
way to strengthen shareholder power, allowing shareholders to 
become fully informed before voting.148  Furthermore, Congress 
deliberately chose disclosure as the means to impact business ethics 
and to address “legal but unseemly” business activities.149 
Today, Regulation S-K, a consolidation and recodification of the 
multiple disclosure requirements in the 1933 and 1934 Acts, governs 
corporate disclosure.150  Regulation S-K does not specify how 
individual items are to be disclosed or accounted for, but rather 
provides general parameters on what must be disclosed.151  These 
disclosure parameters are governed by “materiality,” requiring 
disclosure of information “to which there is a substantial likelihood 
that a reasonable investor would attach importance in determining 
whether to buy or sell the securities registered.”152  The SEC has 
explicitly directed that materiality should be determined by both 
 
143 Jeffrey A. Smith & Matthew Morreale, Disclosure Issues, in GLOBAL CLIMATE 
CHANGE AND U.S. LAW 453, 454 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 2008). 
144 Id. 
145 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (2006). 
146 Williams, supra note 49, at 1204. 
147 Id. at 1205. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. at 1227. 
150 Smith & Morreale, supra note 144, at 454.  For disclosure requirements for small 
businesses, see Regulation S-B, 17 C.F.R. § 228 (2009). 
151 Smith & Morreale, supra note 144, at 456. 
152 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (2009). 
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quantitative and qualitative factors.153  Two current, general 
disclosure parameters in Regulation S-K already discuss aspects of 
environmental law and may be triggered by climate change: (1) Item 
101: cost expenditures for environmental compliance projected over a 
two-year period and compared to competitors and (2) Item 103: 
environmental legal proceedings,154 which focuses on material legal 
proceedings arising under federal and state statutes designed to 
regulate discharge or protect the environment.155  This narrow scope 
of environmental liability disclosure has not changed for the past 
twenty years and is not specifically reflective of the future 
environmental liabilities faced relating to climate change.156 
B.  Climate Change Responsibility Disclosure Possibilities 
In response to climate change and the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Massachusetts v. EPA, corporations are now aware that federal 
greenhouse gas emissions regulations are inevitable.  This heightened 
certainty creates disclosure requirements under Item 101 because this 
regulation requires a corporation to project and then disclose expected 
costs over the next two years to maintain environmental compliance 
in relation to climate change.  While it is likely that it will take ten 
years for the EPA to draft and implement greenhouse gas emissions 
regulations,157 it is almost certain that these regulations will occur; 
thus, the expected costs associated with calculating and mitigating 
these emissions should be estimated now.  In addition, international 
companies with facilities in countries that ratified the Kyoto Protocol 
are already subject to its mandatory targets to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions.158  The resulting capital expenditures abroad should 
certainly require disclosure under Item 101, but this worldwide 
climate change regulatory movement should also trigger anticipated 
expenditures for U.S. facilities to meet similar greenhouse gas 
 
153 Smith & Morreale, supra note 144, at 456. 
154 Id. at 458–65. 
155 Daniel L. Goelzer, Compliance with the Disclosure Requirements of the Federal 
Securities Laws: Management’s Discussion and Analysis and Environmental Matters, 
C110 A.L.I.–A.B.A. 223, 247–50 (1995). 
156 Smith & Morreale, supra note 144, at 455. 
157 See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
158 See Robert DeLay, Our Post–Kyoto Treaty Climate Change Framework: Open 
Market Carbon-Ranching as Smart Development, 17 PENN. ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 55, 69–70 
(2008). 
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emissions reductions, once the EPA announces national standards 
under the CAA.159 
This Comment proposes that these disclosures should detail the 
current emissions of the corporation, the associated costs in the 
emissions calculations, and the costs and expected changes in 
emissions related to possible mitigation strategies.  In addition, a 
comparison to competitors should be included in this disclosure—as it 
is likely that the EPA will look for an industry standard when 
implementing greenhouse gas emissions regulations in a similar 
approach to current pollution standards.  The emissions calculations 
themselves must be included in this disclosure in order for an investor 
to compare the possible costs that will be incurred once the EPA 
regulations are enacted.  By providing investors with readily 
comparable greenhouse gas emissions and their associated costs, 
investors can choose to invest in a corporation that will likely fall at 
or below the maximum greenhouse gas emissions set by the EPA.  To 
remedy these issues, this Comment sets forth suggested SEC 
guidelines under Item 101 in the Appendix, detailing both the scope 
and form for emissions disclosures.160 
Anticipated climate change expenses related to impending climate 
change litigation under Item 103 can also no longer be ignored.  Item 
103 specifies that all pending proceedings, including those “known to 
be contemplated,” should be disclosed.161  Potential proceedings 
resulting from harm caused by climate change have now been 
contemplated, if not initiated.  As an illustration, these potential legal 
proceedings would be especially material to investors in corporations 
being targeted as possible defendants in climate change litigation as a 
result of their significant contributions to greenhouse gas emissions.  
Investors in corporations involved in the energy market would find it 
even more relevant to know about contemplated liability risk since the 
energy sector alone contributes ninety percent of the carbon dioxide 
emissions in developed countries.162  This Comment sets forth 
suggested SEC guidelines under Item 103 in the Appendix, detailing 
 
159 See Smith & Morreale, supra note 144, at 458–65. 
160 See infra Appendix. 
161 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (2009). 
162 See Amit Garg & Tinus Pulles, Energy, in 2 2006 IPCC GUIDELINES FOR NATIONAL 
GREENHOUSE GAS INVENTORIES 1.5.1 (Simon Eggleston et al. eds., 2006), available at 
http://www.ipcc-nggip.iges.or.jp/public/2006gl/pdf/2_Volume2/V2_1_Ch1Introduction 
.pdf. 
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the scope and form for disclosing pending and contemplated climate 
change proceedings.163 
In sum, “[f]or disclosure purposes, climate change is ripening from 
being an ‘uncertainty’ or a ‘trend’ to being an ‘event;’”164 therefore, it 
should be disclosed with all of its likely effects as an opportunity for 
investors to make informed, transparent decisions.  The SEC, 
motivated by the strong public interest directives of section 14(a) and 
the framework of Regulation S-K, can effectively and immediately 
lead this effort for improved disclosure by drafting specific guidance 
on climate change disclosure.  In light of the current press concerning 
climate change and the causal connection between anthropogenic 
greenhouse gas emissions and climate change, it is very likely climate 
change will have a material effect both on corporations that emit 
greenhouse gases and on a reasonable investor in the particular 
corporation.  Thus, the greenhouse gas emissions and their mitigation 
practices within a corporation should be disclosed under Regulation 
S-K. 
The detail and quality of this climate change disclosure will likely 
be highly debated.  Many companies are already jumping on this 
anticipated need and creating voluntary climate change disclosures, 
which vary greatly in content, form, quality, density, and tone.165  In 
addition, investors representing $5.5 trillion in investments have 
already petitioned, or given supportive comments, in response to 
petitions filed with the SEC to require disclosure of specific and 
known trends, events, or uncertainties related to climate change likely 
to have a material effect on a company’s performance.166  Unless the 
SEC expands the current environmental disclosure guidelines, this 
variation will be a major impediment to business efficiency and 
shareholder knowledge, resulting in the unavailability of comparable 
climate change information to the market.  Environmental data 
continues to be one of the most difficult areas of corporate 
information to obtain in a usable, informative form.167  Even when it 
is available, it is normally incomplete or out of date.168  In the interest 
of uniformity, transparency, and increased information disclosure to 
 
163 See infra Appendix. 
164 Smith & Morreale, supra note 144, at 466. 
165 See id. at 472. 
166 For up-to-date information on SEC petitions for climate change guidance, see Ceres, 
About Us: Ceres Annual Reports, www.ceres.org (last visited Jan. 4, 2010). 
167 Williams, supra note 49, at 1290. 
168 Id. at 1291. 
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ensure informed shareholders, the SEC should create a structured, 
uniform, and detailed greenhouse gas disclosure requirement detailing 
the current greenhouse gas emissions, the mitigation strategies being 
implemented to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, the estimated costs 
of compliance with anticipated climate change regulations, and the 
foreseen climate change-related litigation liabilities. 
The SEC already has the statutory authority and disclosure 
framework at hand to eliminate the need for additional climate 
change-specific legislation.  While it will take years for the EPA to 
implement regulations specifying maximum greenhouse gas 
emissions, the SEC can effectively act now to assure uniform, 
comparable disclosure.  Under the 1933 and 1934 Acts, the statutory 
authority granted to the SEC to specify and mandate disclosure is 
broad.169  To determine whether disclosure should be required, the 
court has directed the SEC to consider the following: (1) the extent of 
“ethical investor” interest in social and environmental disclosure and 
(2) the existence of other options available to ethical investors to 
remedy socially or environmentally adverse business practices.170  
This authority also contains substantial flexibility to modify 
disclosure requirements as investor interests change.171  Investor 
interests have now changed to incorporate climate change 
responsibility and thus should be addressed by the SEC.172 
CONCLUSION 
Shareholders and investors are already demanding disclosure of the 
potential regulatory implications and liability resulting from climate 
change and greenhouse gas emissions.  In response to these demands, 
corporate climate change responsibility needs to be transparent and 
uniform, creating informed investors and customers who can readily 
 
169 Williams, supra note 49, at 1249 (citing Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. SEC, 389 
F. Supp. 689, 695 (D.D.C. 1974)). 
170 Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 389 F. Supp. at 701. 
171 Williams, supra note 49, at 1263 (citing Notice of Commission Conclusions and 
Rule-Making Proposals, Securities Act Release No. 5627, Exchange Act Release No. 
11,733, [1975–1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 80,310, at 85,707 (Oct. 
14, 1975)). 
172 The SEC has issued some interpretive guidance about disclosures relating to climate 
change as this Article is going to print.  See Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure 
Related to Climate Change, Release No. 33-9106, 75 Fed. Reg. 6290 (Feb. 8, 2010), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2010/33-9106fr.pdf.  The additions to the 
disclosure requirements in the Appendix of this Article have not been addressed by this 
SEC guidance. 
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compare businesses.  General protection and encouragement of 
responsible decisions regarding climate change by state corporate law 
reform is an option.  Reforms like Oregon’s House Bill 2826 and the 
proposed House Bill 2829 are likely able to be enacted, while 
mandatory climate change legislation is unlikely to be enacted due to 
the race to the bottom and the strong antiregulation mantra among 
business lobbyists.  While these forms of general encouragement are 
simply emphasizing an ability corporations already have to look 
beyond the profit-driven bottom line under the business judgment 
rule, this encouragement also acknowledges the hope that businesses 
will make environmentally conscious decisions. 
Encouragement of this form can be combined with clear, explicit 
SEC guidelines for climate change disclosure under already existing 
federal securities laws.  By combining generally passable state 
encouragement with explicit greenhouse gas emissions disclosure 
requirements, shareholders and customers can make reasoned 
decisions about where their money is invested in light of climate 
change responsibility.  This solution will enable greenhouse gas 
emissions information to become public knowledge and for disclosure 
to be uniform, business to business and state to state, without waiting 
for the lengthy EPA administrative process to be completed.  Through 
greenhouse gas emissions disclosure, the public can choose to invest 
in or buy from environmentally responsible companies that truly 
accept climate change responsibility and, in so doing, bring about 
climate change mitigation, one shareholder at a time. 
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APPENDIX 
PROPOSED CLIMATE CHANGE DISCLOSURE 
Climate Change Responsibility Disclosure Information:173 
Item 101 additions:174 
 Climate Change Responsibility Compliance and Mitigation: 
Report all costs estimated for compliance with anticipated 
climate change regulations, include detailed disclosure of all 
greenhouse gas emissions and mitigation strategies and their 
associated costs to ensure current and impending compliance. 
 a.  Determine the corporation’s geographic scope: choose to 
either report all of the corporation’s greenhouse gas 
emissions worldwide, nationwide, or broken down on a 
state-by-state basis.  These guidelines suggest the most 
comprehensive reporting possible, with nationwide 
reporting as the minimum required. 
 b. Determine if an existing environmental management 
system already captures greenhouse gas emissions 
throughout your company and, if so, what its reporting 
capabilities are. 
 c. Determine the significant emissions for the corporation as 
an entirety per calendar year.  Optional decision to break 
down these corporation-wide emissions by source or 
facility.  These guidelines urge calculating emissions on a 
facility or source basis to both ensure a comprehensive 
picture of the corporation’s profile and better detail 
mitigation strategies and their success. 
  i. One hundred percent of all emissions from all corporate 
operations, facilities, and sources should be included. 
  ii. A percentage of all emissions of any entity, operation, 
facility, or source in which the corporation owns an 
equity share is also to be included.  The percentage 
included is based on the share of operational control the 
reporting corporation has over the facility or source to 
better reflect the corporation’s choice in technology, 
 
173 See discussion supra Part IV. 
174 For other ideas and additional details of greenhouse gas emissions calculations, see 
CAL. CLIMATE ACTION REGISTRY, supra note 26. 
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greenhouse gas mitigation strategies, pollutant 
reductions, and energy conservation methods. 
  iii. A percentage of all emissions of any entity, operation, 
facility, or source that the corporation has a capital 
lease, a financial lease, or an operating lease with are 
also to be included. The percentage included is based 
on the share of operational control the reporting 
corporation has over the facility or source to better 
reflect the corporation’s choice in technology, 
greenhouse gas mitigation strategies, pollutant 
reductions, and energy conservation methods. 
  iv. Emissions Calculations Guidelines: 
  1. One hundred percent of all direct emissions, sources 
owned by the corporation, are to be included in the 
disclosure, including, but not limited to: 
  a. Mobile combustion sources owned or leased by 
the corporation (e.g., cars, trucks, rail, air, or 
other transport); 
  b. Stationary combustion sources used for 
producing electricity, steam, or heating and 
cooling; 
  c. Process emissions from the corporation’s 
production methods (e.g., cement making, 
agricultural processes, etc.); and 
  d. Fugitive sources (e.g., leaks from pipelines, air 
conditioning systems, etc.). 
  2. One hundred percent of all indirect emissions—
produced because of the corporation’s decisions, but 
the source is owned or controlled by another—are to 
be included in the disclosure, including, but not 
limited to: 
  a. Purchased and consumed electricity; 
  b. Purchased and consumed steam; and 
  c. Purchased and consumed district heating or 
cooling. 
  3. Include an estimate and actual calculation of costs 
associated with greenhouse gas emissions, including 
employee time and equipment used to calculate and 
report all emissions. 
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 d. Reporting mitigation strategy implementation.  Once a 
baseline year of greenhouse gas emissions reporting has 
been completed, additional reporting years should be set 
beside each other in tables and graphed with the data from 
previous years to allow for clear comparison.  If emissions 
reports from 1990 are available, include them within this 
reporting.   Mitigation updates should also be included 
describing in words and data any mitigation strategies 
implemented or designed during that year, including: 
  i. Expected greenhouse gas emission reduction for each 
strategy; 
  ii. Expected and actual dates of initial equipment 
purchase or construction and final complete 
implementation; and 
  iii. Expected and actual costs for each mitigation strategy. 
Item 103 additions: 
(a) Provide cost estimates for the company as a whole, or on a per 
subsidiary basis, associated with foreseen climate change-
related litigation including, but not limited to: 
 a. Government-initiated litigation; 
 b. Citizen suit litigation; and 
 c. International human rights litigation. 
(b) Provide ongoing or known climate change-related litigation 
costs for all competitors, whether or not the reporting 
corporation is named as a party within the litigation. 
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